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CONSUMER WELFARE AND GROUP
BOYCOTT LAW
C. Paul Rogers III*
I. INTRODUCTION
LTHOUGH the Supreme Court has long espoused the view that
"[i]t is competition, not competitors which the [Sherman] Act
protects," it has not always meant it.1 It certainly has not always
meant it in the group boycott context.2 But today, if the enhancement of
consumer welfare is to be the sole goal of modern antitrust policy, where
does that leave boycott law? At least some types of concerted refusals to
deal, often called group boycotts or boycotts in antitrust parlance, have
long attracted the per se label. The courts have traditionally deemed it
anticompetitive, or at least unfair, for a group of competitors to conspire
to eliminate an unwanted rival. The resulting per se rule, however, ap-
pears to have developed without any consideration of consumer harm. In
fact, a number of established boycott precedents are based on the protec-
tion of a competitor or competitors rather than competition itself.
3
Lower courts have predictably been all over the lot. The Supreme
Court has given precious little guidance recently, having not decided a
boycott case involving the exclusion of a competitor in well over twenty
years. In that decision, Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Station-
ary and Printing Co., the Court backed off the per se rule and applied the
rule of reason, 4 but with parameters that remain unclear and with no
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University. B.A., J.D. University of Texas; LL.M. Columbia University. Of Counsel,
Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell. The author would like to thank Professor Julie Patterson
Forrester for her helpful comments and to acknowledge the excellent research assistance
provided by Meghan Kreuziger, class of 2009. He would especially like to express appreci-
ation to the Glenn Portman Faculty Research Fund for its generous support of this project.
1. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
2. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. Peoples Gas & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
3. One might argue that the protection of competition means or at least encompasses
the right or opportunity to compete. It is at least a political argument that can be ad-
vanced. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRucrURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 13 (2d ed. 1980); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 19 (1959). The problem is that such a broad inter-
pretation creates a tautology because it does nothing more than work to protect competi-
tors, often at the expense of competition and consumer welfare.
4. 472 U.S. 284 (1985). The Court acknowledged in Northwest Stationers "that there
is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per se rule against group boycotts
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mention of consumer welfare.5
Of course, the last thirty years have been a time of slow but certain
change in antitrust law. In the last decade especially the rule of reason
has expanded at the expense of the per se rule, and consumer welfare has
taken center stage. Efficiency gains are thought to promote consumer
welfare and the rule of reason has looked to market power as an integral
part of its application.
If a showing of consumer harm is now to be required for (1) the per se
rule and/or (2) a finding of unreasonableness under the rule of reason, it
would appear that a good deal of boycott precedent is effectively over-
ruled. But if it isn't, should it be, or is there any reason why an exception
to the consumer welfare model should be carved out for some kinds of
boycotts? Should prior cases be ignored or overruled? And how are
lower federal courts now dealing with the question of consumer harm in
concerted refusal to deal cases, given the paucity of guidance from the
Supreme Court on the question? These are all questions which this Arti-
cle will seek to address.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Although boycotts6 can take many forms, "classic group boycotts" in-
volve conspiring competitors who "cut off access to a supply, facility, or
market necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete."'7 It is impor-
tant to note that this very definition focuses on the effect of the concerted
action on the targeted competitor rather than competition or the effect
on the consumer. Often the conspirators are in competition with the boy-
cott target and are seeking to exclude the target from the market or at
least render it more difficult for the target to continue to compete. Some-
times, however, the conspirators are in a vertical relationship with the
target and are collectively seeking more advantageous trade terms. Thus,
while all boycotts must contain a horizontal conspiracy, 8 their effect may
be horizontal or vertical in nature. 9
than in reference to any other aspect of the per se doctrine." Id. at 294 (quoting LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 83, at 229-30 (1977)).
5. See also, e.g., Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The scope of
the per se rule against group boycotts is a recognized source of confusion in antitrust
law."); CHA-Car, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 752 F.2d 609, 613 (11th Cir. 1985) ("A
concerted refusal to deal is generally subject to a rule of per se illegality" but with "a
confusing array of exceptions and qualifications .... ").
6. The term "boycott" apparently originated in 1880 when Irish peasantry retaliated
against a land agent, Captain Boycott, who paid starvation wages and evicted any who
protested. The tenants called a meeting and secured the pledges of all of Captain Boycott's
servants, herders and drivers to cease all relations with Boycott and his family. See gener-
ally H. LAIDER, BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE 23-25 (1913).
7. Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294
(1985).
8. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (limiting "the per se
rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct
competitors").
9. Indeed, one central problem with the term "group boycott" is that courts have
used it to describe such a wide range and variety of collective action. One court has ob-
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The Supreme Court has applied section 1 of the Sherman Act to outlaw
boycotts since 1904.10 Certainly through the Warren Court years, the
Court was steadfast in its condemnation of collective refusals to deal,
whether the effect was horizontal or vertical. Not surprisingly, the War-
ren Court applied the per se rule to boycotts, giving effect to what was
assumed all along.11
All of the decisions involving exclusion of competitors have, without
exception, focused on the exclusionary effect on the target rather than
the impact of the collective action on the market.1 2 As early as Associated
Press v. United States, decided in 1945, the Court appeared to reject the
relevance of consumer welfare where an exclusionary effect was shown. 13
There the Court held illegal an Associated Press (AP) by-law that prohib-
ited member newspapers from selling or distributing news to non-AP pa-
pers. AP defended on an absence of "indispensability" theory; since AP
news was available to the reading public throughout the United States,
there was no public harm resulting from the by-law. 14 That argument, the
Court held, "would fly in the face of... the Sherman Act... and would
make that law a dead letter in all fields of business."15 According to the
Court, Congress intended the Sherman Act to be "an essential safeguard
to the kind of private competitive business economy this country has
sought to maintain. '1
6
The nadir occurred in the Klor's decision where the Supreme Court
specifically rejected a requirement of a showing of harm to consumers' 7
and ruled that the defendants' alleged conduct was "not to be tolerated
served that using the term is "the equivalent of yelling 'fire' in the halls of traditional
jurisprudence." Universal Amusements Co. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1505, 1523
(S.D. Tex. 1985); see also Kenneth Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2002).
10. See W.W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904); see also E. Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 611 (1914). See generally Charles F. Barber,
Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 872-73 (1955).
11. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961) (finding that an alleged conspiracy to refuse gas for plaintiff's gas burners has, "by
its 'nature' and 'character,' a 'monopolistic tendency.' As such it is not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one .... ); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207, 212 (1959). See also FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968)
("[Under] the Sherman Act, any agreement by a group of competitors to boycott a particu-
lar buyer or group of buyers is illegal per se.").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Radiant Burners, Inc., 364 U.S. at 656; Klor's,
Inc., 359 U.S. at 207: Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); E.
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); W. W. Monta-
gue & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
13. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
14. Id. at 18-20.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Id. Thus, one can argue that the Court here was looking out for competitors, not
consumers. On the other hand, it remains a compelling question as to whether a group of
competitors who control a large segment of the market can collectively act to attempt to
oust others if no discernible consumer harm results.
17. Defendants had submitted without challenge that there were hundreds of competi-
tors in San Francisco within a few blocks of the targeted store. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1959).
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merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small
that his destruction makes little difference to the economy."'1 8 There the
Court distinguished its Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader decision, where it had
held that Congress's intent in enacting the Sherman Act "was the preven-
tion of restraints to free competition in business and commercial transac-
tions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise
control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods
and services."' 19 According to the Court in Klor's, the Apex Hosiery
Court was simply noting that the Sherman Act had limited applicability
to the labor union which was the defendant in that case.
20
The Court closely followed Kor's in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co.21 In that case, the Seventh Circuit had declined to
apply the per se rule to an alleged conspiracy to keep plaintiff's ceramic
gas burners from the market by manipulation of the safety testing meth-
ods of the American Gas Association, which placed its "seal of approval"
on gas burners passing muster.22 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that "[iun the absence of a
per se violation the Sherman Act protects the individual competitor...
only under circumstances where there is such general injury to the com-
petitive process that the public at large suffers economic harm.
'23 It
noted that the plaintiff alleged no public injury because its "complaint
fail[ed] to establish that there has been any appreciable lessening in the
sale of conversion gas burners.., or that the public has been deprived of
a product of over-all superiority.
'24
The Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, firmly disagreed. It
declared that the allegations did support a per se offense because plaintiff
"cannot sell its gas burners, whatever may be their virtues, if, because of
the alleged conspiracy, the purchasers cannot buy gas for use in those
burners." 25 The Court then quoted the language from Klor's about the
protection by antitrust laws of even one small business even though there
is no impact on the economy.
26
Similarly in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, the Court in dicta
stated that the removal by the New York Stock Exchange and its mem-
bers of the private telephone wires of a non-member broker-dealer was,
but for the federal regulatory overlay, a per se violation of section 1 of
18. Id. at 213.
19. 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
20. Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213 n.7. It also noted that "cases subsequent to Apex have
made clear that an effect on prices is not essential to a Sherman Act violation." Id. (citing
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941)).
21. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
22. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.
1959).
23. Id. at 200.
24. Id.
25. Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 659. Although the Court's mention of "purchasers"
of gas might be construed as a sop to consumers, the context of the sentence makes it clear
that the Court's concern was solely on the competitive harm to the plaintiff.
26. Id. at 659.
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the Sherman Act.27 According to the Court, the concerted action de-
prived the plaintiff of a valuable business service which it needed to com-
pete in the over-the-counter securities market.28
Klor's, Radiant Burners, and Silver aside, the Court's focus on competi-
tors rather than competition in the group boycott area does not mean
that it would have decided all of its boycott cases differently under a con-
sumer welfare model. For example, in Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, the Court ruled unlawful a plan of textile and gar-
ment manufacturers which sought to prohibit the sale of garments to
stores that sold "style pirated" garments.29 The Court gave a litany of
reasons as to why the plan was contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act
including, lastly, that it had "as its purpose and effect the direct suppres-
sion of competition from the sale of unregistered textiles and copied de-
signs."' 30 Presumably, the Court was recognizing that consumers would
be harmed by the elimination of the choice of pirated garments from re-
tail outlets, although it did not say so in those words.
Likewise, the very early decision in Eastern States Retail Lumber Deal-
ers' Ass'n v. United States31 appears consistent with a consumer welfare
model of antitrust. In Eastern States, retail lumber dealers were charged
with conspiring to prevent wholesale dealers from selling directly to con-
sumers. 32 Although the opinion focused on the impact of the concerted
action on the targeted wholesalers rather than on the reduction of con-
sumer choice through the elimination of wholesalers as retail sellers, the
finding of a section 1 violation at least indirectly protected that consumer
choice.
Consumer choice was also inadvertently protected in United States v.
General Motors,33 where the Court found an agreement between
franchised Chevrolet dealers and General Motors to curtail car sales by
authorized dealers to so-called "discount houses" to be illegal. In so
holding, the Court focused on the inhibition of the free choice of
franchise dealers to sell to whom they wished as well as the attempt to
insulate dealers from price competition. Relying heavily on Klor's, the
Court also pointed to the effect of the conspiracy in removing the dis-
counters from the market. 34
Of course, those concerns, at least on the General Motors facts, like-
wise protect consumer choice. The Court's language, however, specifi-
cally targeted the impact on the discounting sellers, not the purchasing
public.
27. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
28. Id. at 347-48.
29. 312 U.S. 668 (1941).
30. Id. at 707.
31. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
32. Id. at 605.
33. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
34. Id. at 145, 147-48.
20091
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In spite of the fact that some boycott precedent is at least not inconsis-
tent with a consumer welfare model of antitrust, decisions like Klor's,
Radiant Burners, and to a lesser degree Silver, have remained important
horizontal boycott precedents. In spite of more recent Supreme Court
group boycott decisions, the older cases have, not surprisingly, spawned
decisions protecting competitors or sellers in the lower courts.
35
In keeping with its more proscriptive view of the per se rule in the last
thirty years, in 1985 in Northwest Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Print-
ing Co., the Court held that not all boycotts which exclude competitors
are subject to per se scrutiny. 36 There the Court ruled that the expulsion
by a retail office supply purchasing cooperative of one of its members was
not per se illegal absent a showing that "the cooperative possesse[d] mar-
ket power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective
competition.
''37
While Northwest Stationers is considered a landmark decision,38 the
breadth of its holding remains unclear. The Court took pains to note the
economies of scale inherent in buying cooperatives which "are not a form
of concerted activity characteristically likely to result in predominately
anticompetitive effects."' 39 But is proof of market power or access to
something in the market necessary to compete effectively always required
for illegality or only required when a purchasing cooperative or other
efficiency producing collective activity is involved? 40 In any event, the
Court did not directly mention consumer welfare, although it did note
that the cost savings of the cooperative would enable smaller retailers to
reduce prices and maintain their stock so as to better compete with larger
sellers.41 If the cooperative does indeed have that effect, consumers ben-
efit substantially.
A year after Northwest Stationers, the Court considered FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists, where a group of dentists refused to submit dental
x-rays to insurance companies for use in determining benefits to be
paid.42 Although the Court declined to "pigeonhole" the collective ac-
tion as a boycott and applied the rule of reason,43 it quickly found the
35. Sce, e.g., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (per se rule applied to a National Basketball Association (NBA) rule which prohib-
ited a player from playing for an NBA team until at least four years after the graduation of
his high school class).
36. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
37. Id. at 296.
38. See, e.g., Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and
Substance after Northwest Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden
of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1015-16 (1986) ("[T]he first group boycott
case in the last eighty years in which the Supreme Court unequivocally applied the rule of
reason" was Northwest Wholesale Stationers.).
39. Nw. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295.
40. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding some
market power necessary to establish a per se boycott).
41. Nw. Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295.
42. 476 U.S. 447, 448 (1986).
43. Id. at 459 (noting that the Court has been "slow to condemn rules adopted by
professional associations as unreasonable per se, and, in general, to extend per se analysis
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dentists' refusal unreasonable under the rule of reason because it limited
consumer choice "by impeding the 'ordinary give and take of the market
place.' "44
Thus, Indiana Federation of Dentists does advance the consumer wel-
fare model in the boycott arena, but to an uncertain degree, since it de-
clined to label the dentists' collective action as a boycott, although
recognizing that their conduct "resembles practices that have been la-
beled 'group boycotts."' 45 Collective action that does not involve the at-
tempted exclusion of a competitor but rather seeks a collective benefit
from refusing to deal is often labeled a vertical boycott by lower courts,
which have tended to apply the rule of reason.46 The collective activity in
Indiana Federation of Dentists certainly falls under this description; thus,
it would be a stretch to argue that the case mandates a finding of con-
sumer harm for so-called horizontal boycott activity to be unlawful. In
fact, the Court carefully distanced itself from the so-called per se
boycotts.
Four years later in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,47 the
Court did little to stem the confusion about the appropriate analytical
constructs for the different types of boycotts. In Superior Court Trial
Lawyers, a group of lawyers who regularly served as court-appointed
counsel for indigent defendants in the District of Columbia agreed to
cease accepting appointments until the District increased their hourly
compensation. 48 The Court characterized the conduct as both price fixing
and a boycott and applied the per se rule.49 In a footnote written in re-
sponse to Justice Brennan's opinion, which concurred in part and dis-
sented in part, the Court acknowledged that while some group boycotts
may not merit the per se rule, the one before it did because it also in-
to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious" (internal citations omitted)).
44. Id. (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
45. Id. at 458. In fact, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,
541-44 (1978), the Court had specifically ruled that the alleged boycotters and the ultimate
target did not have to be in a competitive relationship with each other for the activity to be
labeled a boycott. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Para-
mount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); United States v. First
Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The
'group boycott' designation ... is properly restricted to concerted attempts by competitors
to exclude horizontal competitors; it should not be applied, and has never been applied by
the Supreme Court, to concerted refusals that are not designed to drive out competitors
.... "); see also M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973 (1st Cir. 1984);
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966);
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998). But see NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 707 F.2d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
NCAA television plan did not involve a group boycott because the football playing univer-
sities subject to the plan did not compete with the television networks but had only a
vertical relationship with them), affd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
47. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
48. Id. at 422.
49. Id. at 422-23.
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volved horizontal price fixing.50
Of course, the collective action in Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n
constituted a vertical rather than exclusionary boycott since the lawyers
were simply seeking better rates and not attempting to exclude competi-
tors. Thus, the Court still has not made it clear whether or when the per
se rule applies to vertical effect boycott conduct. It did note, however,
that the only customer or consumer in this case, the District of Columbia,
which purchased the defendants' services, was indeed harmed since
higher fees would result. 51
Thus, one can argue that, pursuant to Indiana Federation of Dentists
and Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, proof of consumer harm is re-
quired where boycott activity has a vertical (downstream or upstream),
non-exclusionary effect. Unfortunately, the specter of the Klor's, Radiant
Burners, and Silver decisions' focus on competitors rather than competi-
tion and consumers remains, although the Court did reign in Klor's in its
1998 decision in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.52 There the question was
whether an agreement by a purchaser to buy goods or services from one
supplier rather than another constituted a per se boycott if there was no
legitimate business reason for the purchasing decision. 53 The Court ruled
that the per se rule did not apply absent proof of a horizontal agreement,
making it clear that a decision by a buyer to switch suppliers was typically
not anticompetitive but was rather "close to the heart of the competitive
process that the antitrust laws seek to encourage."
54
The Court in NYNEX declined to overrule Klor's directly and danced
around its language about protecting a single competitor by asserting that
the Klor's Court "thereby inferred injury to the competitive process itself
from the nature of the boycott agreement. 5S In the next paragraph, the
NYNEX Court effectively jettisoned Klor's as a meaningful precedent by
stating that "the plaintiff here must allege and prove harm, not just to a
single competitor, but to the competitive process, i.e., to competition it-
50. Id. at 436 n.19.
51. Id. at 423 n.19.
52. 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
53. The Second Circuit referred to the scenario as a "two-firm boycott." Id. at 133.
54. Id. at 137. The Klor's case was appealed from a motion to dismiss and, although
not at all emphasized in the pleadings or the Court's opinion, did contain an allegation of a
conspiracy among manufacturers who were supposedly all agreeing to accede to the de-
mands of a large retailer not to deal with the retailer's competitor. Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959). The Supreme Court had previously
characterized Klor's as not just involving a vertical agreement between supplier and cus-
tomer. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988). Lower fed-
eral courts had also refused to apply Kor's to two-firm vertical agreements, see, e.g., Oreck
v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), or to a decision by a manufac-
turer or a supplier to replace a dealer or customer with another, see, e.g., Crane & Shovel
Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1988); Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-
Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1982); Burdette v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245,
1249 (5th Cir. 1975); Mullis v. ARCO Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974).
55. NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 134. Of course, there was absolutely no relevant market data
in Klor's, making such an inference a real stretch to say the least.
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self."'56 Thus, while the NYNEX Court did not specify that a showing of
consumer harm was necessary for illegality, the requirement of harm to
competition is arguably the same. 57 Further, by directly contradicting the
Klor's competitor protectionist language, the Court went a long way to
further discredit Klor's and a number of earlier lower court decisions
which followed.
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Although antitrust law is increasingly embracing a consumer welfare
model, 58 it is not surprising, given the uncertain Supreme Court prece-
dent in the concerted refusal to deal area, that lower court decisions lack
consistency. Questionable Supreme Court decisions make for questiona-
ble lower court rulings in spite of the best efforts of lower courts to trav-
erse the Supreme Court boycott minefield. Confusion, however, reigns as
to what constitutes a boycott 59 as well as its appropriate legal analysis.
Several lower court decisions, twenty years old or more, followed the
Supreme Court's lead in Klor's and applied group boycott law to protect
a competitor rather than competition or consumer welfare. For example,
in Taxi Weekly, Inc. v. Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc., the Sec-
56. Id. at 135. Harm to "the competitive process" could be taken to mean protecting
the opportunity to compete. Protecting the opportunity to compete typically means pro-
tecting competitors. See, e.g., Carl Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 19 (1959); Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The
Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 369-70 (1965); cf Harlan M. Blake & William
K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 439
(1965); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
377, 381-84 (1965). Thus, it was necessary for the NYNEX Court to specify that by harm to
the competitive process it meant harm to competition.
57. The Court conceded plaintiff's claim that the defendant purchaser's switching of
suppliers had harmed consumers because of the increase in telephone rates that resulted.
But the Court noted that consumer injury resulted from the lawful monopoly power of
NYNEX subsidiary New York Telephone coupled with a deception worked upon the regu-
latory authority which prevented the authority from controlling New York Telephone's
exercise of its monopoly power rather than the mere switching of suppliers. Id. at 136.
58. For a recent example, see Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber
Co., 549 U.S. 312, 313 (2007) (holding that predatory bidding presents less of a threat to
consumer harm than does predatory pricing). See also, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert
H. Lande, The Chicago School's Foundation is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not
Efficiency, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CON-
SERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 89 (Robert Phofsky ed., 2008); HER-
BERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 48-77 (3d ed. 2005); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); Ru-
dolph J. R. Peritz, Confidential Communique from Brussels-Antitrust in America: Fugitive
on the Run, 62 SMU L. REV. 621 (2009).
59. For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984), the district court had ruled that the NCAA's threat to expel colleges not
adhering to its television plan and the network's refusal to deal with colleges other than in
accordance with the plan were per se illegal boycotts. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.
v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 131-12 (W.D. Okla. 1982). The Tenth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that no group boycott was involved since the schools have only a vertical relationship
to, and do not compete with, the networks. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA,
707 F.2d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court found the plan to be an unrea-
sonable output limitation but did not mention the possibility of a group boycott as a basis
for illegality. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
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ond Circuit upheld a jury verdict against New York City taxi fleet owners
for conspiring to drive a taxi industry trade paper out of business. 60 De-
fendants argued that no diminution of competition occurred from the
plaintiff's demise because another trade paper soon replaced it.61 The
court ignored the argument, instead focusing on the conspirators' intent
to drive plaintiff out of business.
62
Similarly in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, the Seventh Circuit, over a vig-
orous dissent, ruled that the unsuccessful bidder for the Chicago Bulls
professional basketball franchise was the subject of an unlawful group
boycott by the successful bidder and the owners of the Chicago Stadium,
where the team played its home games. 63 The court considered whether
consumer harm was required for an antitrust violation and concluded
that, although antitrust may be moving in that direction, it was not yet
there.64 It paid lip service to the idea that antitrust was intended to pro-
tect competition, not competitors, but concluded, without citation to au-
thority, that "[t]he antitrust laws are concerned with the competitive
process.'"65 As a result, the court concluded that antitrust "does not de-
pend in each particular case upon the ultimate demonstrable consumer
effect."
66
Judge Easterbrook vigorously dissented, noting that Chicago had one
professional basketball team before the allegedly unlawful conduct and
one team after it.67 He observed that the conduct complained of did not
reduce quantity, increase price, or affect quality, and that there was "no
claim of consumers' injury, actual or potential, now or in the future.
'68
At best, according to Easterbrook, the targeted conduct was "a business
tort in antitrust clothing."
'69
In spite of cases like Taxi Weekly and Wirtz, lower courts have increas-
ingly required allegations of consumer harm to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. For example, in Spanish Broadcasting System of Flor-
ida, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, the plaintiff alleged that a
conspiracy kept it from competing in the Spanish language radio station
60. 539 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1976).
61. Id. at 912.
62. Id. at 913.
63. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 541 (7th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 536. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), as an example of a decision, "in the natural
monopoly area at least," where the Supreme Court has not embraced the consumer wel-
fare model. Id. Judge Easterbrook's dissent, however, argued that Otter Tail was in fact a
case where consumer injury was very likely absent the application of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 571 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 536 (majority opinion).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 563 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part).
68. Id. Judge Easterbrook further noted that consumers may have in fact gained from
the sale of the Chicago Bulls to one entity rather than the other because the merger of two
monopolists (the Bulls and the Chicago Stadium) may result in lower overall prices for
consumers than when the monopolists supplied each other (the Bulls supplied fans to the
Stadium, and the Stadium supplied an arena for the Bulls). Id.
69. Id. at 585.
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market.70 In affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had failed to allege harm to the
competitive process and thereby to consumers as was required.
71
Both the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits have also affirmed
the requirement of an allegation of consumer harm for a plaintiff to pro-
ceed past the filing of the complaint. In Full Draw Productions v. Easton
Sports, Inc., an archery trade show producer alleged that a rival trade
show producer and a number of archery manufacturers and distributors
had conspired to eliminate it from the trade show market. 72 The district
court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs alleged no harm
to the manufacturers and distributors, who were actually the consumers
of plaintiff's trade shows.73 The Tenth Circuit reversed, reaffirming the
need for consumer harm but holding that the plaintiff had satisfied the
requirement because defendants' alleged conduct had directly reduced
the amount of exhibitor space and thus, the ability of consumers of that
space to acquire it and display their products.74
Some courts have applied Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat75 to
dismiss putative boycott claims on antitrust injury grounds pursuant to
section 4 of the Clayton Act. There the Supreme Court made clear that a
private antitrust plaintiff must allege injury to competition and not just
harm to itself as a competitor in order to establish a section 4 claim. 7
6
Thus, courts in so-called staff privilege or peer review cases, where a
physician is claiming an unlawful exclusion, dismiss complaints because
the plaintiff is claiming no more than injury to himself as a competitor
rather than injury to competition. 77 Most go on to specify that in order to
show competitive injury, the plaintiff must show that the exclusion harms
consumers. 78 Other courts have declined to dismiss because of a failure
70. 376 F.3d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 1071. See also Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Smythe, Cramer Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 882,
895 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (dismissing the complaint because of an insufficient allegation of
anticompetitive effects or injury to the public).
72. 182 F.3d 745, 747 (10th Cir. 1999).
73. Id. at 749.
74. Id. at 753-54. The court had first noted that customer boycotts of a producer could
be illegal. Id. at 752; see also SCFC LLC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 971-72 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding a Visa bylaw which effectively refused membership to Sears was not
illegal because no harm to consumers was shown).
75. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
76. Id. at 487-88. Plaintiff alleged that it would lose business and thus profits because
of the defendant's "deep pocket" entry into the market by its acquisition of a competitor.
The Court noted that in essence the plaintiff was complaining of its harm from increased
competition, rather than of injury flowing from harm to competition itself. Id.
77. See, e.g., Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, Inc., No. 95-35241, 1996 WL 442524, at *5
(9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996) (unpublished disposition) (noting that injury to one anesthesiologist
is not an injury to competition); Singh v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1252
(D.N.M. 2008) (dismissing a radiologist's complaint where he merely alleged "harm to a
single competitor at a single hospital rather than injury to competition," which "does not
come within the purview of the antitrust laws").
78. See, e.g., Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1551 (11th Cir.
1996) (stating that the focus of the rule of reason analyses is "whether the exclusion
reduces competition among providers in the market and thereby harms consumers"); Lie v.
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to allege competitive injury, while reaffirming that the plaintiff will have
to prove consumer harm to withstand summary judgment or to recover at
trial.79 Lower courts have also required consumer injury in boycott cases
in the summary judgment context 8° as well as in a motion notwithstand-
ing the verdict. 8
1
It seems, especially in cases involving professional sports, that the
lower courts have long been off track. For example, in Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management, Inc.,82 a district court misapplied the Silver decision
and struck down an NBA rule that prevented a player from playing for an
NBA team until four years after the graduation of his high school class.83
The court applied the per se rule, holding that since the NBA did not
permit an individual player to petition for consideration of his specific
case and did not provide "even the most rudimentary hearing" before
excluding an individual player, the rule of reason "exception" of Silver
was inapplicable.
84
Thus, the district court both misapplied Silver and the per se rule under
the authority of Silver. That decision required some semblance of due
process only because of the government's specific delegation of some se-
curities regulatory authority to the New York Stock Exchange. 85 The
government delegated no such authority over professional basketball to
the NBA. 86 Further, as discussed above, Silver's per se rule protects a
competitor, not competition. Similarly, in All-Pro Management, the court
protected the right of an individual player, Spencer Haywood, without
considering the impact of the NBA rule on consumers, who would pre-
St. Joseph Hosp. of Mount Clemens, Mich., 964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that
the plaintiff showed no harm to the consumer and dismissing the case); Wigod v. Chi.
Mercantile Exch., 981 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1992); Perry v. Rado, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047
(E.D. Wash. 2007) (noting that "[rieduction of competition does not involve the Sherman
Act until it harms consumer welfare" (quoting Rebel Oil Co. v. ARCO, 51 F.3d 1421, 1433
(9th Cir. 1999)); J. Allen Ramey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found. For Med. Care, 999 F. Supp.
1355 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Fox v. Good Samaritan Hosp., No. C-04-00874, 2007 WL 2938175, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2007).
79. See Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 64 F.3d 869, 876 (3d Cir. 1995).
80. See, e.g., Wigod, 981 F.2d 1515.
81. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994).
82. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
83. Spencer Haywood was the player actually challenging the rule. He had played one
year at Trinidad State Junior College in Colorado before transferring to the University of
Detroit, where he played one year before seeking entry into the NBA draft. NBA, NBA
Encyclopedia: Playoff Edition: Spencer Haywood, http://www.nba.com/history/players/hay-
woodbio.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
84. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
85. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364-65 (1963) (noting that the Securities
Exchange Act instituted a scheme of self-regulation).
86. See also Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass'ns, 754 F.2d 698, 707-08 (7th Cir. 1985) (find-
ing a voluntary certification program to violate section 1 because it was arbitrarily applied
without due process); Wash. State Bowling Prop. Ass'n v. Pac. Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371,
374, 376 (9th Cir. 1966) (applying a per se rule to a Bowling Proprietors Association of
America rule requiring that tournament bowlers restrict their bowling to member estab-
lishments where there was no provision for a hearing for nonmember bowling alleys).
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sumably be the fans who buy tickets to the games.87 Were the fans
harmed by the four-year rule? Maybe yes, maybe no, but the court did
not consider the issue.
88
Subsequent to the Spencer Haywood decision, similar age-based re-
strictions were struck down in cases involving professional hockey89 and
football.90 More recently, Maurice Clarett, a running back at Ohio State,
challenged the NFL's rule limiting eligibility for its draft to players who
are at least three years removed from their high school graduation.91
Clarett was suspended by his school and the NCAA after his freshman
year and sought unsuccessfully to enter the NFL draft. The district court
held that Clarett had demonstrated antitrust injury because he had estab-
lished that the NFL rule did in fact exclude him and others similarly situ-
ated from having an opportunity to compete in the relevant market,
professional football. 92 In so holding, the district court noted that the
Supreme Court in Klor's had ruled that group boycotts were injurious to
competition and thus could give rise to antitrust injury even when the
conduct does "not affect price or output, or even when [it] affect[s] price
or output in a way that is beneficial to competition.
'93
The district court in Clarett did recognize that a split exists in the Sev-
enth Circuit as to whether a plaintiff must show that the targeted conduct
causes loss arising from reduced output or increased prices to establish
antitrust injury.94 It, however, dismissed the Seventh Circuit's require-
ment of consumer injury in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partner-
87. For consideration of whether the players, as sellers of services, should be treated as
consumers under the antitrust laws, see infra text accompanying notes 152-62.
88. Today the argument for consumer harm would be stronger than when the Hay-
wood case was decided since now so many players straight out of high school or with just a
year of college have become top caliber NBA players. As a result, they have improved
NBA's product and made it more attractive to its fans. In contrast, Spencer Haywood was
the first "underclassman" to enter the NBA, and he did so when the conventional wisdom
was that an individual needed four full years of college to become mature enough to suc-
ceed in the NBA.
89. Linesman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (preliminary
injunction against rule making players younger than twenty ineligible for league draft). Cf.
Neeld v. Nat'l Hockey League, 594 F. 2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (rule barring one-eyed play-
ers from playing in league games upheld).
90. Boris v. U.S. Football League, No. CC 83-4980, 1984 WL 894 (D. Cal. Feb. 28,
1984) (league rule barring players who had not completed college struck down as an un-
lawful boycott).
91. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
92. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
93. Id. at 399.
94. Id. at 398; see Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1097 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the
necessity of showing "consumer impact" in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 529, 536
(7th Cir. 1986), a case involving an alleged conspiracy to keep the plaintiff from acquiring
the Chicago Bulls basketball franchise. As noted above, Judge Easterbrook's dissent
scolded the majority for imposing antitrust liability to what was essentially a business tort
with no appreciable consumer harm. Id. at 563-64 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part); see
supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
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ship v. NBA95 as dicta.96
On the merits, the Clarett court found that the NFL rule violated the
rule of reason, 97 although it viewed the rule as a naked restraint of trade.
It focused on the exclusion of "competitors" from the NFL market alto-
gether, finding no solace in the temporary effect of the rule or any of the
NFL's purported justifications.9 8 The court noted that the alleged harm
was not to the consumers who watched the players, but to the players
themselves, who were selling their services. 99 It concluded that "age-
based eligibility restrictions in professional sports are anticompetitive be-
cause they limit competition in the player personnel market by excluding
sellers."lOO
In support of its reasoning, the court noted that the Sherman Act at a
minimum forbids restraints of trade that were unlawful at common law,
including contracts which unreasonably restrict one from practicing his
profession or trade.10 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has said as much more
than once. 10 2 Thus, presumably the line of cases outlawing restrictive
covenants as restraints of trade that began with Mitchel v. Reynolds in
1711 would be apposite.1
0 3
95. 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992).
96. 306 F. Supp. 2d at 398. In Chicago Professional Sports the Seventh Circuit noted
that every antitrust plaintiff had "to show that its loss comes from acts that reduce output
or raise prices to consumers." Chicago Profl Sports, 961 F.2d at 670. The district court in
Clarett pointed out that in Chicago Professional Sports the NBA had on appeal dropped its
argument that plaintiff could not show antitrust injury and that the Seventh Circuit had
noted that the antitrust injury question was not before it. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
97. The court applied the rule of reason rather than the per se rule on the authority of
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984), which it read
as mandating the rule of reason where a sports league is involved. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d
at 405.
98. Id. at 405-09.
99. Id. at 402.
100. Id. at 405.
101. Id. (citing Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949)). The Gardella
case involved a challenge to baseball's reserve clause by a former player for the New York
Giants who had jumped to the Mexican League and then been barred from returning to
play in Major League baseball. Id. at 403. The three judge panel each wrote separate opin-
ions, with no one joining in another's opinion. Id. at 403, 407-08. Judge Hand's opinion
was in the majority and cited by the Clarett court for the proposition that all restraints of
trade unlawful at common law violated the Sherman Act, including "a contract which un-
reasonably forbids any one to practice his calling." Id. at 408; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at
382. Judge Chase disagreed, stating that section 6 of the Clayton Act, which states that the
labor of a human being in not a commodity or article of commerce, establishes that Con-
gress did not intend the Sherman Act to cover restraints on employment. Id. at 406.
102. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498 (1940); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
103. 1 P.Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). Today employee covenants not to
compete are subject to reasonableness scrutiny under common law, totally apart from the
Sherman Act or state antitrust statutes. See, e.g., Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 861 P.2d
531, 540 (Wyo. 1993) (requiring a showing of reasonableness in duration and geographical
limits); Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993) (requiring reasonableness in
geographical limitations); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 32-22
(Tenn. 1984) (noting that generally, restrictive covenants in employment contracts are only
enforceable if reasonable); Cukjati v. Burkett, 772 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. 1989); Ehlers v.
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It is here with its common-law roots, however, that something has to
give if antitrust law is to have a pure consumer welfare goal, for the exclu-
sion of a competitor from a market, whether an artisan (or football
player) trying to ply his or her trade, or a company seeking to compete in
a market, may or may not have an impact on consumers. It would de-
pend on the structure of the market, entry barriers, the size of the ex-
cluded entity and other factors. In antitrust injury terms, a plaintiff must
show that "its loss comes from acts that reduce output or raise prices to
consumers.'
1 0 4
VI. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSUMER HARM
The district court in Clarett carefully distinguished the "price or out-
put" rule by noting that the claimed harm there was to a seller, not a
buyer, of services. But would the Supreme Court agree with the distinc-
tion? There is increasing evidence that it would not. The Supreme Court
noted thirty years ago that Congress intended the Sherman Act as a "con-
sumer welfare prescription."'105 In a recent predatory bidding decision,
Weyerhauser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,10 6 the Court
declined to back away from its allegiance to consumer harm. It refused
to apply a more lenient standard for establishing predatory bidding than
for predatory pricing, recognizing the danger of false positives in both
and noting that failed predatory bidding schemes can benefit consum-
ers.107 The Court went on to observe that predatory bidding presents less
of a direct threat to consumers than does predatory pricing. 108
Further, in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC,
Inc.,109 the Court pointedly resisted interpreting the Robinson-Patman
Act in a manner "geared more to the protection of existing competitors
than to the stimulation of competition.'"1 0 That decision involved an al-
legedly illegal price discrimination from a competitive bidding process
among dealers for defendant's trucks. In holding that the Robinson-Pat-
man Act did not extend to that situation, the Court observed that the
Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1971). See also Harlan M. Blake, Em-
ployee Covenants Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960).
104. Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992).
105. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 334 (1979).
106. 549 U.S. 312, 313, 325 (2007) (holding that the similarities between predatory pric-
ing and predatory bidding require the same standard to be applied to both and requiring
that a plaintiff show a "dangerous probability of recoupment" because failed predatory
bidding schemes may actually benefit consumers).
107. Id. at 313.
108. Successful predatory pricing depends ultimately on higher prices being charged to
consumers to recoup the seller's losses from it below cost sales while chasing its competi-
tors from the market. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 223 (1993). A predatory bidding scheme, in contrast, could be successful with no
effect on consumers because a predatory bidder does not necessarily have to rely on the
raising of prices in its output (sales) market to recoup its losses. Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at
324.
109. 546 U.S. 164 (2006).
110. Id. at 168.
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defendant supplier's selective price discounting fostered competition
among suppliers of different brands of trucks. 1 ' Thus, the Court noted
that it continued to construe the Act "consistently with the broader poli-
cies of the antitrust laws."
112
Other recent Supreme Court decisions have similarly focused on con-
sumer welfare as the lynchpin of antitrust policy. For example, in Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Court focused on the
impact of resale price maintenance on the consumer in overturning an
almost one hundred-year-old per se ban on the practice." 3 The Court
noted that "It]here is a widespread consensus that permitting a manufac-
turer to control the price at which its goods are sold may promote inter-
brand competition and consumer welfare in a variety of ways."11 4 In
State Oil v. Khan, the Court similarly focused on the benefit to consumers
of low prices in overturning the per se rule against maximum resale price
maintenance.11 5
Not surprisingly, parallel to the Court's move to a pure consumer wel-
fare model of antitrust law has been its movement away from per se rules
and its enlargement of the rule of reason. Beginning with the watershed
Continental T.V., Inc. v. Sylvania, Inc." 6 decision in 1977, the Court has
almost systematically eliminated or narrowed per se rules with respect to
non-hard core collective conduct." 7 In Sylvania, the Court first focused
on the primacy of interbrand competition in overruling use of the per se
rule and adopting the rule of reason for vertical non-price restraints. 118
Thus, it seems highly unlikely that today's Supreme Court would sanc-
tion a group boycott cause of action by a single competitor excluded from
a market, such as in Klor's, or of the exclusion of a seller of inputs to a
111. Id. at 172-73.
112. Id. at 181 (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 220; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979)).
113. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
114. Id. at 2715 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 9, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480)).
115. 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S.
328, 340 (1990)); see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (noting that
competition produces the best price levels and that collusion may produce prices that harm
consumers).
116. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
117. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721-23 (rule of reason for minimum resale price main-
tenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 17 (1997) (rule of reason for maximum resale
price maintenance); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984)
(per se rule for tying arrangements upheld but with requirement of market power in tying
product market); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 297 (1985) (rule of reason for some group boycotts which exclude a competitor);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 476 (1978) (clarifying that the
rule of reason applies to interseller price verification or dissemination); United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975) (rule of reason for interseller price verifi-
cation); see also Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961)
(clarifying that the rule of reason applies to exclusive dealing arrangements).
118. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. The Sylvania decision also put to rest another outdated anti-
trust goal: that of protecting against restraints on alienation. Id. at 54 n.21. See generally
C. Paul Rogers III, Restraints on Alienation in Antitrust Law: A Past with No Future, 49
SMU L. REV. 497 (1996).
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market, such as in Clarett, absent proof of harm to competition and thus
to consumers. Weyerhauser alone suggests no less, since there the Court
made clear its allegiance to consumers in a predatory bidding scheme
where the prices of inputs were bid up to exclude a competitor of the
alleged predator.
The question remains whether consumer harm is required for so-called
per se boycotts, assuming one can ascertain what a per se boycott looks
like. We know from NYNEX that it must contain a horizontal conspir-
acy.119 The Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n 120 decision at a minimum
leaves open the prospect that a so-called vertical effect boycott, where the
providers of a service are seeking higher compensation rather than trying
to exclude anyone from the market, may be per se illegal. The court
seemed to hold that proof of market power is not always necessary for
per se condemnation, 121 but hedged its bet by acknowledging that the
case before it involved price fixing as well as a boycott. 122 Thus, it may be
that a per se boycott may take different forms, as long as a horizontal
conspiracy is present.
So-called vertical effect boycotts such as those in Indiana Federation of
Dentists and Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n have, as noted, 2 3 ac-
knowledged consumer harm from the targeted conduct. They, like
Clarett, involved sellers of services although, unlike Clarett, the conspir-
acy involved those sellers rather than the buyers of the services offered.
It seems axiomatic that consumers will be harmed when sellers collec-
tively withhold their goods or services or collectively hold buyers up for
higher prices, as in Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n. No competitor is
excluded from the market in that scenario, but buyers have their options
limited or must pay a higher price. 124 In these cases, just as with price
fixing, consumers of the goods or services sold are adversely affected by
the collective action.
125
It is where market exclusion occurs as a result of collective action that
consumer harm is more problematic. The exclusion, for example, of a
119. 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (noting that precedent "limits the per se rule in the boy-
cott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors").
120. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
121. "But an assumption that, absent market proof of market power, the boycott...
was totally harmless... is flatly inconsistent with the clear course of our antitrust jurispru-
dence." Id. at 435-36.
122. Id. at 433 n.15.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
124. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 771-72 (1992) (involving
foreign and U.S. reinsurers allegedly conspiring to reinsure only commercial general liabil-
ity policies written on a "claims-made" basis); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438
U.S. 531, 535 (1978) (involving medical malpractice insurers allegedly conspiring to restrict
coverage to "claims-made" policies); see also Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 30, 42-43 (1930) (noting that the Sherman Act was enacted not to prevent
injury to one individual but to prevent harm to the general public and competition);
United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1930).
125. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (finding the




single competitor or single seller may not affect consumer welfare if con-
sumer choice or preference is not seriously affected. For example, in
Klor's, consumer harm would be present only if the exclusion of Klor's
from the market for the sales of RCA, General Electric, Admiral, Zenith,
and Emerson brand household appliances significantly limited consumer
choice in the San Francisco area. This seems unlikely given that there
were hundreds of retail outlets for brand name appliances in San Fran-
cisco at the time.
126
It is perhaps even more difficult to see how any potential consumer
harm could be generated by the conduct, labeled per se illegal, in the
Silver decision127 The plaintiff was a non-member stockbroker who had
his private wire connections to the New York Stock Exchange severed.
Presumably, any of Mr. Silver's customers who wished to continue to in-
vest in the stock market would have had many other brokers to choose
from.
In Clarett, consumers of the NFL would appear to be the fans who
attend games or watch them on television. 128 It is unlikely that they are
harmed by the NFL's three-year rule since few, if any football players, at
least on past experience, are able to play in the league when they are
eighteen or nineteen years old.129 Thus, it would be difficult to establish
that the caliber of play is diminished by the rule or that consumers are
126. The Klor's defendants had submitted unchallenged affidavits alleging as much.
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209-19 (1959). Of course, if Klor's
was a discount house, free-riding on the sales and promotional efforts of Broadway-Hale
next door, it could claim its exclusion harmed consumers by eliminating the lowest price
alternative in the market. While the competitive effect of free-riding is the subject of con-
siderable academic debate, see, e.g., Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylva-
nia and Its Rule of Reason: The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 22 CONN. L. REV. 129, 147 (1989); William S. Comanor, Vertical Price
Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REv. 983,
987 (1985); Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Eco-
nomics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 736 (1985); Robert Pitofsky, Sylvania:
Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978), the Su-
preme Court has viewed it as a drain on interbrand competition because it provides disin-
centives to the high service retailers which are essential for the manufacturer to compete.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2716-17 (2007);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd.
v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992).
127. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
128. The district court, however, viewed the teams of the NFL as the likely consumers.
Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 399 n.123 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd on
other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). It observed that it made little sense to require
consumer harm in a labor context where the allegedly conspiring defendants are the con-
sumers of labor. Id. at 399. But that view seems to ignore the fact that professional football
fans are irrefutably the consumers of the entertainment product that labor and the teams
provide and that without them there would be no professional football jobs and no profes-
sional football product.
129. While it is relatively common for college football players to subject themselves to
the NFL draft after their junior year in college, it is less common for a player to be drafted
after just two years in college and very rare for a player to be drafted after just one year in
college, in contrast to college basketball. See infra note 127.
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somehow harmed by the rule. 130
If the courts are to embrace fully a consumer welfare model of antitrust
in the group boycott arena, they must seek to determine whether the ex-
clusionary effect of the collective action has a significant impact on con-
sumers. The first step, then, is to identify who the consumers of the goods
or services at issue are; then the analysis should focus on whether those
consumers are harmed by the collective conduct at issue.
While the identification of the consumers often seems obvious, it is not
always so. For example, college football's Bowl Championship Series
(BCS) has come under scrutiny as a possible illegal boycott, since access
to the lucrative BCS bowls by Division 1A football teams has been une-
ven at best.' 3 ' If one focuses on the effective exclusion of certain schools
from the BCS bowls by competitors with significant collective market
power, an attractive antitrust case can be made. But if consumer harm
must be shown, who are the relevant consumers and are they harmed?
The answer to the second part of the question, of course, depends on
the answer to the first part. One could argue, as the BCS surely would,
that college football fans generally are the consumers and thus benefit,
since they have long been clamoring for a national championship game
for Division 1A football. 132 Since college football fans typically have
strong allegiances to one school, often their alma mater, however, con-
sumer harm in the BCS may come down to "where you stand is where
you sit." Fans of non-BCS schools certainly believe they are harmed by
their schools being relegated to second class status by the BCS while fans
of BCS schools would presumably feel harmed only if they believe their
team was wrongly excluded from the national championship game. 133
One could also argue that the television networks that bid for the right
to exclusively telecast the BCS bowl and the national championship
games are the appropriate consumers. The winning bidder pays a multi-
million dollar rights fee, but are they thus harmed by the BCS's collective
action? It would be a stretch to so argue, since the networks' bids are
130. The outcome might be different if the NBA was to adopt a three-year rule since a
number of players, such as Dwight Howard, Kobe Bryant, LeBron James, Kevin Garnett,
and Amarie Stoudamire, have skipped college and played successfully in the league. Many
others have made an impact in the NBA after playing only a year or two in college. Thus,
one might successfully assert that the caliber of play and excitement of the league would be
diminished under a three-year rule, to the detriment of the fans (consumers) of the league.
131. See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III, The Quest for Number One in College Football: The
Revised Bowl Championship Series, Antitrust, and the Winner Take All Syndrome, 18 MAR-
QUETTE SPORTS L.J. 285 (2008).
132. The response to this argument would likely be that the BCS system is not the only
way in which to achieve a national championship match-up. Other methods, such as a
more egalitarian play-off system, could be designed without discriminatory access. See id.
at 297.
133. A recent example would be the 2008 University of Texas Longhorns, who were not
selected to play in the national championship game even though they had defeated the
University of Oklahoma, which was selected, 35-25 at a neutral site during the regular
season. Fans of the non-BCS University of Utah, which went undefeated in 2008, likewise
felt harmed by their school's exclusion from the national championship game in favor of
two teams with one loss apiece.
20091
SMU LAW REVIEW
made in a competitive market and are motivated by the networks' assess-
ment of potential advertising revenues. The point is that identifying con-
sumer harm may be difficult in some cases, particularly those involving
college or professional sports.'
34
V. UNFAIR COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST
If the showing of consumer harm is to become a predicate for the ille-
gality of group boycotts, however, can antitrust law live with the prospect
of a group of competitors ganging up on one of their ilk to drive them
from the market as long as consumer choice is not materially affected? 135
This type of collective action seems to be, at a minimum, mean-spirited
and unfair, and was certainly troublesome to the Court in Klor's. 36 But
of course, as history has shown, antitrust law cannot protect both compe-
tition and competitors, although the Court has certainly on more than
one occasion tried. 13
7
In fact, the goal of antitrust has been increasingly the protection of the
competitive process rather than some sort of reckoning of "fair" competi-
134. For example, there is little doubt that salary or wage caps imposed on athletes or
coaches by a league or governing association are illegal price fixing. See, e.g., Law v.
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). (Of course, the antitrust labor exemption permits
salary caps in professional sports leagues negotiated through the collective bargaining pro-
cess to stand, see, for example, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996); NBA
v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).) The argument that wage ceilings restrict costs and thus
benefit consumers does not wash because it countenances the use of buyer cartel market
power to disrupt the price-setting function of the free market. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1022-
23; see also Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). One
could assert that the consumers in a wage scaling case are actually the athletes themselves
as sellers of services in an input market. That argument, however, does violence to the
generally accepted notion of consumers as buyers rather than sellers of goods or services.
It is also unnecessary since it is well established that monopsonists (buyers with market
power) harm consumers by misallocating resources and diminishing consumer choice. See,
e.g., Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Roger D.
Clair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and Antitrust Policy,
86 Nw. U.L. REV. 331, 342 (1992); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer
Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2644-45 (19965).
135. The answer in Taxi Weekly, Inc. v. Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc., 539
F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1976), was no. There the Second Circuit held that a conspiracy by an
organization of taxi fleet owners to drive a taxi industry trade paper out of business was an
unlawful group boycott because of the intent of the conspirators to drive the plaintiff out
of business. Id. at 912-13. The court ignored the argument that no harm to competition
occurred because a rival trade paper was created to replace the plaintiff's. Id.; see also
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 538 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The fact that the precise
impact of defendants' conduct on the broad consuming public has remained unfocused
here does not prevent a finding that the antitrust laws have been violated."); Consol. Metal
Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988); Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1984).
136. "[This combination] is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one
merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the econ-
omy." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
137. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("It is compe-
tition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress'
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned busi-
nesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result .... ").
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tion.138 Cutthroat competition or "ruinous" competition is not a problem
unless engaged in by a monopolist. Price cutting, while a pejorative term
to competitors or cartel members, is pro-competitive because consumers
benefit from the lower prices. Gentlemen's agreements to not cut prices
or enter each others' markets are per se illegal because of their effect on
competition, even though some competitors may be harmed. Competi-
tors may not deem price cutting or reneging on agreements to be fair
competition, but such actions are in fact the very essence of the competi-
tion the antitrust laws seek to protect.139
Unsavory market behaviors such as the theft of trade secrets, 140 style
piracy,141 infringement of a patent,142 or misappropriation of a trade-
mark 143 are not examples of fair competition, but they are examples of
138. See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (noting that "un-
fair competition" laws, business torts and regulatory laws were proper remedies for com-
petitive practices offensive to business morality); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) ("Even an act of pure malice by one
business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the fed-
eral antitrust laws; those laws do not create a federal law of unfair competition .. "); see
also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissent-
ing in part) (explaining that "real competition" is not fair but is "bruising rivalry, in which
people go out of business under intense pressure").
A dissenter might point to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which ren-
ders illegal "unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court has interpreted that provision to cover anticompetitive conduct which
might fall short of a Sherman Act violation since "[t]here is no limit to human inventive-
ness in this field." FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1934). The Court has
consistently focused on applying section 5 to conduct which offends "the spirit," even if not
the letter, of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyer Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411, 421 (1990) (holding a lawyers' boycott to coerce greater fees to be "unfair"); FTC
v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953) (noting that Congress left
the concept of "unfair methods of competition" in section 5 of the FTC Act flexible, to be
defined by cases in the area); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
467-78 (1941) (finding a boycott of style pirates violated section 5). Lower courts have
been reluctant to apply section 5 beyond established Sherman Act proscriptions. See, e.g.,
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise Cascade
Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 1980).
139. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312, 313 (2007) ("[A]ctions taken in a predatory-bidding scheme are often 'the very es-
sence of competition' because a failed predatory-bidding scheme can be a 'boon to con-
sumers"' (quoting Brooke Group. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 224 (1993))); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986) ("[C]utting prices in order to increase business is often the very essence of
competition.").
140. E.g., Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785, 790 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding a former
employee's use of trade secrets anticompetitive).
141. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941)
(finding that style piracy was one type of competition and did not justify an unlawful
boycott).
142. E.g., Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that a patent owner can be subject to antitrust liability if the infringer proves either that
1) the "patent was obtained through knowing and wilfull fraud"; or 2) that the suit was "'a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor"' (quoting R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961))).
143. See Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968, 975




how some competitors compete in the marketplace. 144 Thus, those types
of competitive behavior do not violate the antitrust laws, although they
may well run afoul of common law or state proscriptions.
145
VI. EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
So-called exclusionary conduct is to be reckoned with, when engaged in
by a monopolist or near monopolist. Monopolists who engage in unto-
ward conduct in keeping or driving rivals out presumably harm consum-
ers, who are deprived of the fruits of competition. 146 Thus section 2 is, or
at least should be, concerned with exclusionary conduct only because
consumers will suffer, and not because rivals will be excluded. In that
type of case, however, the exclusion of rivals by a monopolist harms both
the competitor and consumer. Thus, a competitor of a monopolist typi-
cally has antitrust standing to bring a section 2 action since the harm to it
as a competitor mirrors the harm consumers will suffer from the exclu-
sionary conduct.147 In contrast, as noted above, conduct by competitors
which has the exclusionary effect of driving out a rival may or may not
harm consumers, depending on the shape of the market.
Group boycott activity which excludes a rival from a market with many
sellers is likely consumer-neutral. On the other hand, the same joint con-
duct that excludes a rival from a highly concentrated market is likely to
harm consumers by eliminating an important purchasing option. 148 As
144. The so-called Pick-Barth doctrine, in which business torts were treated as unlawful
per se under the antitrust laws because there was no arguable pro-competitive justification
for them, Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Co., 57 F.2d 96, 102-03 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932), has long been abandoned by the First Circuit and not
followed elsewhere. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508
F.2d 547, 561 (1st Cir. 1974); see also Havaco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549,
554-56 (7th Cir. 1980); Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin National Bank, 624 F.2d
798, 812-13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980); Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark
Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 85 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
145. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (urg-
ing federal courts to rid themselves of "private state tort suits masquerading as antitrust
actions"); see also Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941)
(deciding whether style piracy is a tort is question of state law); Hunt v. Crumboch, 325
U.S. 821, 826 (1945) (stating the Sherman Act does not "purport to afford remedies for all
torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate commerce").
146. In Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 457 (1993) the Supreme Court
rejected a line of Ninth Circuit cases which had held that bad acts alone can establish the
requisite intent and dangerous probability of success prongs for an attempt to monopolize
a claim. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1964). According
to the Court, "It]he purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect business from the
working of the market, it is to protect the public from the failure of the market." Spectrum
Sports, 506 U.S. at 458.
147. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands, Inc., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985)
(finding that a rival of monopolist ski resort company was entitled to section 2 relief);
Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986); MCI
Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
148. As noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 36-39, the Court in Northwest
Stationers recognized the competitive impact of that type of exclusionary conduct by re-
quiring proof of "market power or unique access to a business element necessary for effec-
tive competition" for per se liability. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
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noted, section 2's concern is also with conduct that is labeled exclusion-
ary, but in the hands of a monopolist. For example, in Spectrum Sports,
the Supreme Court observed that section 2 "directs itself not against con-
duct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself."'1
49
Nonetheless, the so-called antitrust gap purposefully differentiates be-
tween single firm conduct by a non-monopolist and agreed upon conduct
by two or more actors. 150 According to the Supreme Court, single firm
conduct by a non-monopolist is placed beyond the antitrust pale to avoid
"discourag[ing] the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to
promote.' 151 On the other hand, "concerted activity inherently is fraught
with anticompetitive risk."'1
52
True enough, but the question remains whether concerted conduct
which simply harms a competitor and does not injure consumers should
be actionable under section 1. The answer absolutely depends on the un-
derlying policy of the Sherman Act. To fail to require consumer harm to
establish an illegal group boycott would bifurcate antitrust policy and re-
verse the Supreme Court's course to unify antitrust as "a consumer wel-
fare proscription.' 1 53 It would, in effect, create an exception for group
boycotts, since the balance of antitrust does seek to foster consumer
welfare. 1
54
VII. GROUP BOYCOTT EXCEPTION TO THE CONSUMER
HARM REQUIREMENT?
The creation of an exception to congressional policy as interpreted by
the Supreme Court seemingly requires a compelling reason. The protec-
tion of competitors or, as in the Clarett decision, sellers of a product or
service, are the only plausible reasons. Since surely the protection of
149. The Court went on to state that section 2 "does so not out of solicitude for private
concerns but out of concern for the public interest." Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459. In
fact, the standards for establishing exclusionary conduct in section 2 cases have become
more exacting in recent years as the Supreme Court has recognized that "[m]istaken infer-
ences and the resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly because they chill the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."' Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (noting that it is difficult for a court
to control price cutting without chilling "legitimate price cutting"); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort
of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104. 122 n.17 (1986).
150. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-77 (1984).
151. Id. at 775.
152. Id. at 767-68.
153. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
154. One could point to the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006), as an ex-
ception to the consumer welfare rule since it does penalize lower prices in some instances.
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear its intention "to construe the Act 'consist-
ently with broader policies of the antitrust laws."' Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-
Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 181 (2006) (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440
U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979)).
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competitors will not carry the day any longer, is there a persuasive reason
to treat sellers differently? That is, should sellers of goods or services be
protected against upstream vertical concerted refusals to deal absent any
showing of consumer harm?
It is true that, beginning with Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc. 155 more than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court has given manufac-
turers more freedom to determine how they sell and market their prod-
ucts. But that solicitude was because of the Court's recognition that
interbrand competition "is the primary concern of antitrust law."1 56 The
promotion of interbrand competition protects consumers generally by as-
suring competition by competing manufacturers as well as protecting
against the exploitation of intrabrand market power, which can limit con-
sumer choice. 15
7
Thus, Sylvania provides no reason for protecting sellers, qua sellers,
without a showing of consumer harm. If anything, the protection of sell-
ers is even less compelling than the protection of competitors who are
typically being excluded from a market or disadvantaged by the actions of
rivals, as opposed to the actions of buyers in a vertical relationship. Thus,
sellers should be treated like competitors and gain no relief without a
showing of consumer harm.
158
Further, an exception would require a recalibration of antitrust stand-
ing and injury requirements in private enforcement actions. As noted,
section 4 of the Clayton Act requires that plaintiffs prove injury "by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 159 Since the Brunswick
decision,1 60 the courts have required that an antitrust plaintiff show harm
to competition, and not just to itself.
161
For example, it is doubtful whether the plaintiff in Klor's could satisfy
the Brunswick test. To do so, it would have to establish, in addition to the
conspiracy alleged,162 that consumers were harmed by its elimination
from the market as a retail outlet for the affected household appliances.
The defendant had characterized the dispute as a "purely private quarrel"
and had submitted "unchallenged" affidavits alleging that there were
155. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
156. Id. at 52 n.19.
157. Id.; see, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[W]ith
respect to the cost of distribution services, the interests of the manufacturer and consumer
are aligned."); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,
369-70 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating the rationale for restricted distribution policies "depends on
the alignment of interests between consumers and manufacturers").
158. See, e.g., Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 182 F.3d 745, 753-54 (10th Cir.
1999).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
160. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
161. See, e.g., Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2008); Perry v. Rado,
504 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (E.D. Wash. 2007); J. Allen Ramey, M.D., Inc. v. Pac. Found.
for Med. Care, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Fox v. Good Samaritan
Hosp., No. C-04-00874, 2007 WL 2938175, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2007).
162. The case was appealed from the dismissal of the complaint; thus the conspiracy
had only been alleged, not proven. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 212-13 (1959).
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hundreds of other household appliance retailers in the area, some within
a few blocks of Klor's. 163 Assuming that those affidavits were uncon-
tested, today the plaintiff would quickly be out of court.
Thus, there does not appear to be a principled reason for an exception,
unless it might be that antitrust should guard against collections of com-
petitors ganging up to exclude rivals or boycott sellers because such ac-
tions offend one's sense of business or marketplace propriety. But that
would fundamentally change the nature of the antitrust law and intro-
duce, or rather reintroduce, the concept of competitive fairness as an an-
titrust goal. It would, in fact, transform the antitrust law into what is
essentially a business tort for unsavory behavior towards others in the
marketplace.
164
VIII. THE PRICE OR OUTPUT APPROACH
Rather than take that step backward, one might hope for more defini-
tive guidance from the Supreme Court. Although the recent Court has
not shied from overruling itself,16 5 it may be too much to ask it to over-
rule old group boycott dogs like Klor's, Silver, and Radiant Burners.
166
The Court, however, has proven adept at ignoring precedent it does not
like,167 winnowing away case law it becomes uncomfortable with 168 or, as
in Northwest Stationers, making standards tougher for the per se rule.
169
To require a showing of consumer harm as a prerequisite for illegality
for all concerted refusal to deal or group boycott conduct does mean
parting ways with the idea that all common law restraints of trade are
encompassed in the Sherman Act. It means that an individual profes-
163. Id. at 209-10.
164. See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 563 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting in part) (lambasting the majority for imposing antitrust liability "for
what was essentially a business tort with no appreciable consumer harm").
165. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (over-
ruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)); State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968));
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
166. See, for example, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9
(1984), where the Court observed that "[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unac-
ceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se."' It then pro-
ceeded to significantly narrow the per se rule as applied to tying arrangements. More
recently, however, the Supreme Court, in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712-25 (2007), did overrule a ninety-six year old precedent, the per se
rule for vertical price fixing.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 394 U.S. 270 (1966); Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
168. See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1998) (limiting the
possible reach of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)); see also
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004)
(characterizing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands, Inc., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), as "at or
near the outer boundary of § 2 liability").
169. See also United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 617-19 (1977)
(limiting the per se rule for tying arrangements); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (same).
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sional or tradesman does not have an antitrust claim absent some show-
ing of harm to consumers of that trade or profession. 170 It also means
dispensing with those few cases which hold that an effect on price or out-
put is not required for a Sherman Act violation. 171 For an effect on price
or output remains a prerequisite to showing consumer harm.
172
The price or output approach has the great advantage of bringing order
to the chaos which has long accompanied group boycott law. It requires a
market analysis in all cases and avoids scenarios which protect only com-
petitors, sometimes at the expense of efficiency gains. It avoids the doc-
trine without the boundaries (or principles) problem of cases like Klor's,
Silver, and Wirtz; if antitrust does sometimes protect competitors without
discernible harm to the market generally, how do we know when? Is it all
the time, most of the time, or just some of the time? Does it depend on
the nastiness of the collective behavior? What is the abiding goal or prin-
ciple the law is seeking to further? The answers to those questions be-
come straightforward or moot if consumer welfare is the goal.
IX. APPLICATION OF PER SE AND RULE OF REASON
ANALYSES TO BOTH EXCLUSIONARY EFFECT AND
VERTICAL EFFECT GROUP BOYCOTTS
While more analytical precision is called for, it does appear unlikely
that the Supreme Court will ever overrule the per se rule for group boy-
cotts or concerted refusals to deal. Nor, arguably, should it. So-called
naked boycotts, even Judge Bork recognizes, 173 should be per se illegal.
Thus, following the lead of Northwest Stationers and as in tying cases after
U.S. Steel v. Fortner Enterprises and Hyde, the per se rule in a classic
horizontal effects group boycott should be applied only to circumstances
in which the horizontal conspirators control a substantial share of the
170. See, e.g., Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding no anticom-
petitive effect where assistant college football coach barred from coaching by NCAA alleg-
ing only injury to himself); Deesen v. Prof'l Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir.
1966) (finding a tournament eligibility rule designed to prevent inferior players from com-
peting in PGA tournament reasonable); Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (finding a suspension of NBA player for betting on his team to be "as reasonable a
rule as can be imagined").
171. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 214 n.7 (1959)
("[C]ases subsequent to Apex have made it clear that an effect on prices is not essential to
a Sherman Act violation."). The Court only cited Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941), where the point is arguably dicta since it would not be
difficult to show an effect on price through the exclusion of style pirates from the market
for retail clothing.
172. The price or output approach also accounts for abuses of input markets by buyer
cartels which seek to restrict the price paid or volume purchased for goods or services. See
Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Law v. NCAA, 134
F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, 2135, at
181 (1999). If the input buyers lack market power, their joint purchasing activity is un-
likely to affect the market price or output and will be allowed. See, e.g., Addamax Corp. v.
Open Software Foundation, Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1998); Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs.
Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
173. ROBERT BORK, THE AN-rrRuST PARADOX 334 (1978).
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market so that the exclusion of a competitor has a meaningful impact on
consumers by materially reducing their purchasing options. In other
words, injured competitors who cannot show consumer injury need not
apply.
If, however, the alleged boycotters present colorable efficiency claims,
as in Northwest Stationers, the rule of reason should apply even if defend-
ants do control a large part of the market. Presumably, the balancing
required by the rule of reason should sort out the overall competitive
effect of the conduct just as in the many other rule of reason applications
in antitrust law. If the defendants do not possess an appreciable market
share, consumer harm is unlikely, so resort to the quick look 174 should
allow a court to quickly dispense of the claim, assuming it has not kicked
the plaintiffs out on antitrust injury grounds.
It remains uncertain whether the per se rule applies to so-called verti-
cal effects group boycotts. 175 There is Warren Court dicta indicating that
it does.176 The purpose, while not exclusionary in effect, is for better
trade terms or conditions than the conspirators presumably can achieve
for themselves. Those advantages will typically affect price or output, if
the conspirators command the requisite market share.177 Thus, there is
no discernable reason for analyzing vertical effect boycotts differently
than boycotts which exclude a competitor. After all, price fixing conspir-
acies are not exclusionary in effect, but certainly merit per se treatment
because of the elimination of price competition between the conspirators.
If the conspirators control the market, such as in Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, and there are no colorable efficiencies, the per se rule
should apply since consumers will be adversely impacted.
178
If, as with exclusionary boycotts, colorable efficiencies exist where the
conspirators have market power, the rule of reason should nonetheless
174. The "quick look" developed in cases such as FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986), NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 110 (1984), and National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978). It posits that in some cases, a "quick look" by one "with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question
would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets." See Cal. Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
175. See supra text accompanying note 50.
176. See FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968).
177. For example, in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457 (1986),
the Court noted that the defendant dentists' withholding of x-rays from insurance compa-
nies made it more costly for the insurers and their patients to gain information needed to
evaluate the dentists' diagnosis.
178. For example, consider the facts of St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,
438 U.S. 531, 535 (1978), where the four insurance companies writing medical malpractice
policies in Rhode Island agreed to only write policies on a more restrictive "claims made"
basis rather than providing coverage on the more expansive "occurrence" basis. Since the
four conspirators monopolized the medical malpractice insurance market, competition as
to the type of medical malpractice insurance available was totally eliminated. Id. at 553.
Thus, output was limited and insurance premiums were likely to rise, given the reduction in
competition. Consumers, whether the physicians purchasing the insurance, or their pa-
tients, who would probably have the higher cost of medical malpractice insurance passed
on to them, would be harmed.
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govern with the understanding that consumer harm will have to be shown
for the conduct to be deemed unreasonable. Courts should still utilize
the quick look where the conspirators lack market power.
In sum, recognition of the requirement of consumer harm through the
prism of injury to competition does not require overruling of the per se
rule. It does, however, require some market analysis before its applica-
tion and will alter and narrow when the per se rule applies, at least when
compared to older Supreme Court precedent.
X. CONCLUSION
Group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal are one of the few, if not
the only, antitrust areas in which some courts persist in using the Sher-
man Act to protect competitors without regard to the targeted conduct's
impact on competition. It is far too late in the day of the movement to-
ward a consumer welfare model of antitrust for rogue applications of
competitor protectionism to persist. Antitrust law is designed to give
competitors relief only when they are harmed by conduct which also
harms competition. Absent that criteria, antitrust law becomes largely
formless and unpredictable, a disconcerting prospect when treble dam-
ages are at stake. By requiring injury to competition as defined by show-
ing harm to consumers for all types of group boycott activity, however,
the great uncertainty that has long surrounded group boycott doctrine
greatly dissipates.
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